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“ADULT INCAPACITY LAW: VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE DRAWN FROM THE 
UNFINISHED STORY OF A NEW SUBJECT WITH A LONG HISTORY” 
 




In 1961 Adrian Ward was one of the first intake for the first full-time law degree in Scotland. 
He was enrolled as a solicitor in 1967 and practised for approximately 50 years. From 1976 
he was gradually drawn into the subject of what is now known (in Scotland) as adult 
incapacity law, in which he became a national and then international expert. As his interest 
and involvement developed, so did the subject. However, although it is still a new subject, 
its history in law goes back to Roman law, and concepts from Roman law were central to 
leading cases in the development of the subject in which Adrian was involved. Attempts to 
protect the human rights of defined groups go back in Scotland to the 7th century, but there 
is fundamental conflict between the concept of universality of human rights, and according 
particular rights to defined groups. Violations of human rights often start with putting people 
into categories seen as “other”. A deliberately personalised lecture confronted the audience 
with personally witnessed human rights violations. Of the concepts defined in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, “reasonable accommodation”, though 
it attracts more attention, is always second-best to non-discriminatory solutions offered by 
“universal design”. Human rights must be translated into law, and law into practice. Existing 
law should be understood, used to maximum effect, and then if necessary improved. 
Measures for the exercise of legal capacity can be categorised as voluntary, involuntary, and 
third party, but need to recognise the reality that “capability” and “incapability” are the 
extreme ends of a wide spectrum. Such variations, and individual progressions through them, 
must be accommodated in general provision and in individual measures. Fundamental 
concepts of human rights and their progressive developments have driven progress to date, 
and enabled probable future trends to be identified. 
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My subject today is “Adult incapacity law: visions for the future drawn from the unfinished 
story of a new subject with a long history”. 
 
In over 43 years since I first lectured on this subject, this will be different. It will be 
personalised, and not sanitised. I shall try to encapsulate where we are, and where we are 
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It is a great honour that those intersections bring me right now to Edinburgh Napier 
University, at an event created and hosted by the Centre for Mental Health and Capacity Law. 
In my first significant conversation with Jill Stavert, I said that Scotland needed such a Centre, 
and Jill replied by telling me of her aim to establish one. I pay tribute to her huge achievement 
in creating and continuing to develop this Centre. And I thank her for providing the 
opportunity for this lecture. 
 
I start with these two themes. First, the converging sequence of human rights translating 
into law, and law translating into practice, towards making theoretical rights real for individual 
people who need them most. Lauterpacht wrote that “the basic unit of all law is the individual 
human being”1. Second, for us lawyers, is the sequence of understanding the law, using the 









Starting with fundamental human rights, a former synagogue in Prague has an exhibition of 
drawings made by children in Treblinka Concentration Camp, with personal details of each 
child artist, including their dates of death – mostly in October 1944, and some on the very 
day on which I was born. Those times produced the first formulations of fundamental human 
rights which continue to apply. Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 reads as follows: 
 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and SHOULD act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
That word “should” identifies a tension between what as a species we may do, and what 
“reason and conscience” tell us we should do. We are a contradictory species, capable both 
of great compassion, and of great cruelty. While we are comfortably together here, extreme 
violations of human rights are happening somewhere in the world, right now.  
 
A psychiatrist, recently returned from counselling victims of such atrocities, had terrible 
stories to tell. He was asked: “What sort of people can behave like that?”. He told me: “The 
worst thing of all is that they are people just like you and me”. 
 
Both the UN Declaration of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drafted two years later, point to another long-standing 
theme, that of discrimination within anti-discrimination. The anti-discrimination Articles of 
 
1 “The individual human being”: Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations, the Law of Nature, and the Rights 
of Man” (1943), in Problems of Peace and War, ed. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 29 (Oceana Publications, 1962) 31. 
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both Conventions give a list of common grounds of discrimination, but neither mentions 
disability, in both cases relegated to the words “or other status” at the end2. The same trend 
towards discrimination within non-discrimination can be seen in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The key definition in Article 1 of that Convention reads as 
follows: 
 
“Persons with disabilities INCLUDE3 those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
This strangely non-exclusive definition, and renderings of it limited to the description after 
the word “include”, has the effect of prioritising people who fit that part of the definition, and 
thus marginalising those who do not. People with short-term mental and intellectual 
impairments may well need the protections of the Convention. Also marginalised are people 
whose cognitive impairments are disabling even when all barriers are removed. They are the 
very people who most need the protections of the Convention. They should be at the centre 
of its requirements, not marginalised. Any interpretation of the Convention that has to 
squeeze them in as “hard cases” is flawed and unacceptable, supporting “discrimination 
within anti-discrimination”. 
 
Scotland’s world-leading record in our subject includes recognition and protection of 
fundamental human rights going far further back than my lifetime. Over 14 centuries ago 
Adamnan’s “Law of the Innocents” protected children and others in time of war, with specified 
penalties and enforcement mechanism4. Sadly, breaches of that principle continue to this 
day, as do wider breaches of the fundamental rights of children, including in particular 
children with disabilities. As a boy in the 1950s, in the village where I still live, we were aware 
of the large house in the woods full of such children. It was several years later as a member 
of the Local Health Council that I first saw inside it. What I saw was shocking. When such 
establishments became subject to educational inspection for the first time, an experienced 
and hard-bitten Inspector of Schools told me how – after his first visit – he sat in his car, and 
wept.  
 
We may have moved on, but efforts to place children more appropriately have led to other 
issues, such as children with disabilities placed far away from home areas and families, often 
cross-border. Such a case is currently before the Court of Session. In the case of young 
people aged over 16, this focuses a particular aspect of the more general scandal that 
Scotland was the first country in the world in which the Hague Convention 35 on the 
 
2 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 2: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. …” 
3 My emphasis. 
4 Cain Adamnan, 697 AD, a “perpetual law on behalf of clerics and women and children” protecting them in 
time of war, acceded to by over 50 “kings”, enforced through judges appointed specifically for the purpose. A 
heavy fine was imposed upon “whoever wounds or slays …. an innocent child under the ordinance of Adamnan’s 
law”, with the same fine “for him who commits the deed and for him who sees it and does not save to the best 
of his ability”; and “if there is negligence or ignorance, half the fine for it”. 




International Protection of Adults was ratified, but it has still not been ratified in respect of 
England & Wales. 
 
More serious breaches of the human rights of children persisted longer in other parts of our 
own continent. On my very first visit to the former Soviet Union following its breakup, I 
learned how in a low wage, high employment economy parents of children with disabilities 
were under huge pressure to surrender them into institutional care. The alternative, which 
some bravely adopted, was to conceal such children within their own homes. On that very 
first visit I stayed in such houses. I also met two young doctors whose dream was to create 
a school and day centre for such children, enabling them to continue to live with their own 
families. Cutting a long story short, we worked together, converting the dream to reality, a 
reality which became an example for the region, and which continues to thrive5. 
 
But what of children already in institutional care? Eventually that project began to take them 
out, but in one of those early visits one of those doctors took me to such a place. The most 
disabled children were accommodated not on the ground floor, with easiest access to the 
grounds, but on the top floor, furthest from human view. They were held in cage-like cots. 
They were so starved of human contact that, if you went close, they hurled themselves at 
you – if they could. Some soft toys gifted from the west were pinned high on the wall as 
ornaments. At mealtimes they were lifted out of their cots and placed around a large bowl of 
food for which they sometimes fought. Annual mortality rate was 8%. My guide looked me 
straight in the eye and said: “the cause of death is usually certified as pneumonia”. 
 
Of course, violations of the basic human rights of adults as well as children also continued 
long after the fundamental Conventions. One of those young doctors shuddered as we walked 
down the street. “Are you alright?” “It’s that building.” It was the former KGB headquarters. 
Her father was a quiet and decent man. I had been a guest in their house. She told me that 
he had been held here and continuously tortured for 18 months, before he and his parents 
were deported to Siberia. Similarly, with other hosts in another country, I was shown the 
yard behind a building where a lorry was parked with its engine running all night – to try to 
drown out the screams of people being tortured.  
 
A first-hand example, one among many, was the “social institution” seen during one of my 
WHO visits, where the director entertained our team lavishly to lunch. When he escorted us 
around, I noticed female residents visibly shrinking from his presence. I also noticed that he 
steered us away from one particular building. We persisted in wanting to see inside. After a 
pantomime that no-one could find the key, we gained admission to what I can only call a 
hellhole, crammed with men with no activity or stimulation of any nature, dominated by the 
stink of the malfunctioning toilet.  
 
I tell you these personalised examples to dispel any feeling that serious human rights 
violations can be depersonalised as distant in time or space. We slide towards them whenever 
people become defined by characteristics and put into categories. They become “other”, 
 
5 Tartu Maarja Kool, Tartu, Estonia, see www.maarja.tartu.ee.  




depersonalised, in perception if not in language “Untermenschen”, be they people defined by 
colour, gender, status as immigrants or refugees, or people with disabilities. They are placed 
outside the scope of normal human compassion.  
 
Such depersonalisation is constantly to be found, in some degree or other; and generally in 
gradually increasing degrees when politics move further to the right or to the left or in both 
directions, as is happening in the United Kingdom currently. We have seen the consequences 
of such slides in other places and in other times. We enjoy no automatic immunity. The 
situations that keep our Equality and Human Rights Commission busy are worrying both in 
themselves and in their implications. To characterise as perpetrators hard-pressed front-line 
staff doing their best with hopelessly restricted resources is often unfair. We have to look to 
those who impose constraints and create cultures.  
 
On 18th July 2019 the Supreme Court finally determined the case of MM6 about personal 
independence payments. For MM, the difference between requiring “prompting” or “social 
support” was the difference between qualifying for PIP and not. He was successful all the 
way from the Upper Tribunal through the Court of Session to the Supreme Court. The 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions not only challenged his entitlement in successive 
appeals, but even although the case was said to be concerned with a general point of 
statutory interpretation, MM was deprived of the payments which he ought to have received 
for some four years from when he first applied for them. I would say quite firmly that no 
adequately civilised regime would have deprived a disabled person of such prospective 
entitlement while battling on a point of law, for that length of time. But we live in a society 
where – according to the press last week – a person who admits to having said of benefits 
claimants that “these people need putting down” is deemed to be a suitable parliamentary 
candidate for one of our major parties7. 
 
However, attempts to respond to such categorisation and depersonalisation lead to a 
contradiction. The essence of human rights is universality: they apply to every human being 
on our planet by virtue of being a human being. They have been created to counteract risks 
of denial of those rights to people categorised as “other”. But if we try to define particular 
categories, giving them enhanced protection, do we not strengthen that concept of 
otherness? By putting definitional boundaries around those categories, do we exclude some 
people who need those protections? Do we risk treating included people as units within a 
special category, rather than as individuals in all their variety, risking discrimination within 
anti-discrimination? 
 
Protection of special categories is as old as the concept of human rights, as my example of 
the law of Adamnan shows. But many key provisions of the Universal Declaration begin 
“Everyone …” or “No-one …”. Do we need more than emphasise that everyone means 
everyone and no-one means no-one? Do we need a Disability Convention or other special 
Conventions? 
 
6 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v MM [2019] UKSC 34. MM claimed PIP on 25th February 2015. The 
Supreme Court decision was issued on 18th July 2019.  
7 The Times, November 5th 2019, page 8.  





Accepting that we do have that Convention, that concern is exemplified by the definition of 
disability that I have already quoted. It also leads to a further contradiction, exemplified by 
the definition of discrimination on the basis of disability in Article 2 of the Disability Convention 
as: 
 
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It 
includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation.” 
 
To apply a “reasonable accommodation” to some people with some disabilities in some 
circumstances, albeit with the best of intentions, is discriminatory. I much prefer the concept 
of “universal design”, which is inclusive. Its use in the law and legal processes is seriously 
under-developed. To take simple examples, if some witnesses are permitted to sit while 
giving evidence while others stand, the feeling of differentiation can cause them to be less 
confident, and for that to be communicated as less certainty about what they are saying. 
Why doesn’t everyone sit down, including those questioning them? Even at the beginning of 
their evidence, does the formulation “raise your right hand and repeat after me” add veracity 
to the following evidence, and accordingly do people who cannot raise their right hand, or 
do not have one, automatically contribute less veracity?  
 
Just a week ago the press reported a relaxation in the Court of Session, allowing judges and 
counsel to appear without the customary court dress – but only in hearings not involving 
giving evidence8. One would prefer to have seen evidence-based assessment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of wearing, or not wearing, court dress when litigants and 
witnesses are present, including persons with disabilities or other vulnerabilities. 
 
More generally, as demonstrated in the paper “Access to justice for people with disabilities”9 
by Dr Polona Curk, a psychologist with Essex Autonomy Project, and me of August 2018, the 
Equal Treatment Bench Books both sides of the border are valuable resources, but essentially 
contradict their titles. Rather than promote equal treatment of people with disabilities, they 
attempt to mitigate unequal treatment.  
 
Of course, discrimination in the administration of justice takes more serious forms. A major 
culprit is Scottish Legal Aid Board, refusing to sanction minimum necessary periods of time 
for solicitors to take instructions and advise when dealing with people with mental health and 
other issues. To refuse to sanction Legal Aid for clients whose ability to instruct cannot be 
confirmed on the basis of a maximum of ten minutes on the telephone, even for those with 
severe difficulties in communicating at all by telephone, is a clearly discriminatory violation 
of the right to legal advice and representation. I have heard it suggested that this particular 
practice has stopped, but I am reliably informed by practising solicitors that it has not. 
 
 
8 See Court of Session Practice Note (No. 1 of 2019) “Court dress in Outer House”, dated 31st October 2019, 
taking effect on 1st December 2019. 
9 http://www.mentalcapacitylawandpolicy.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Article-132-paper-.pdf 




Let us move from rights to law and practice, and some long-term trends identifiable from the 
development of Scots law. 
 
Nowadays we talk about voluntary measures where formerly we called them anticipatory 
measures; involuntary measures where formerly we called them responsive measures; and 
third party measures. Let us run through the history of principal measures in the involuntary 
and voluntary categories taking us to where we now are. 
 
In relation to involuntary measures, please look at Diagram A10. One theme is shifting 
terminology, to which I shall return. Another more seriously problematical one is the 
importation of child law to be applied to adults with disabilities. This takes us to a long-
running and fundamental tension between doing what is “easy and certain” and what is 
“more difficult and less certain”. 
 
What is easy and certain? It is easy and certain to divide adult humanity into people deemed 
to be fully capable and responsible, and those deemed to be completely incapable and 
incapacitated. All juridical acts by the former are valid and binding. All juridical acts by the 
latter are void. Once this simple categorisation has been established, it is easy and certain to 
put people into the incapable category upon medical diagnosis of a defined relevant disability, 
without further enquiry into the effects of that disability. And once that category has been 
created, the easy option is to apply to people within that category the existing ready-made 
and well understood law applicable to young children.  
 
Thus, as we can see from Diagram A, a statute of 1585 imported the Roman law of children 
and applied it to adults with cognitive impairments. In 1913 the existing law of children was 
used to create a form of statutory guardianship for adults.  
 
What is wrong with the easy and certain option? It is fundamentally discriminatory to place 
any adults, however disabled or frail and elderly, into a category of quasi-children and to 
deprive them of some of the basic rights held by all other adults11. That violates the primary 
concept that human rights attach to every human being on our planet. Adults, however 
disabled or elderly, are not “big children”. It is inappropriate to apply to any adults traditional 
concepts of child law, such as “best interests” tests and plenary, incapacitating guardianship. 
Relevant disabilities do not eliminate the rights of every adult to exercise autonomy and self-
determination. Indeed, if capabilities are limited, the exercise of autonomy and self-




10 Appended to this paper. 
11 Scottish Law Commission Report No 151 on Incapable Adults, September 1995, Paragraph 2.50: “Our general 
principles do not rely on the concept of best interests of the incapable adult … ‘best interests’ does not give due 
weight to the views of the adult, particularly to wishes and feelings which he or she had expressed while capable 
of doing so. The concept of best interests was developed in the context of child law … We think it is wrong to 
equate such adults with children, and for that reason would avoid extending child law concepts to them. …” 




This leads to an even more basic objection to the ”easy and certain” option. It has never 
coincided with reality. Concepts of total capability and total incapability are the extremes, 
probably fictional extremes, bracketing a huge range of variable capabilities in between. At 
one extreme, it is doubtful whether anyone is so robust that they could never need any form 
of support or protection. At the other extreme, complete incapability, and with it the 
connotation of lack of any individuality as a person, is most certainly a fiction. I call the space 
between those extremes “the gap”. Where in theory “the gap” should be filled by a 
presumption of capacity, in practice it is often filled by a presumption of incapacity. 
 
The gap! 
“Capability”       “Incapability” 
Presumption of capacity? 
Presumption of incapacity? 
 
Let us now follow the history of voluntary measures, leading us to confront that same gap. 
Nowadays the most common voluntary measure is the power of attorney, but until 1990 it 
was believed in many quarters that the authority of the attorney automatically ceased if the 
granter lost relevant capacity. My clients complained “you give us an umbrella, then take it 
away when it starts to rain”. In 1990 we went by statute to the opposite extreme12. All powers 
of attorney were assumed to continue in force following impairment of relevant capacity, 
unless the document explicitly stated otherwise: with no controls or safeguards either at time 
of granting or during operation. Hence the elderly gentleman who was admitted to hospital 
and in quick succession granted three powers of attorney in favour of three different relatives. 
Since 2nd April 2001 we have had the safeguards at time of granting, and during operation, 
contained in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 200013. However, at first sight the 
language of that Act inhabits the binary world of capability or incapability, ignoring the gap 
between. Thus, both sections 15 and 16 refer to “the event of the granter’s becoming 
incapable in relation to decisions about the matter to which the power of attorney relates”, 
with a similar formulation in section 18. The same binary approach appears in the definition 
of a continuing power of attorney in Principle 2.1 of Council of Europe Recommendation 
(2009)11 on principles concerning continuing powers of attorney and advance directives for 
incapacity, as:  
 
“a mandate given by a capable adult with the purpose that it shall remain in force, or enter into force, in 
the event of the granter’s incapacity.” 
 
We should note at this point the long-running commitment of Council of Europe to preferring 
voluntary measures over involuntary measures, and generally supporting the principles of 
autonomy and self-determination. Principle 7 of Recommendation (1999)4 on principles 
concerning the legal protection of incapable adults reads: 
 
“Consideration should be given to the need to provide for, and regulate, legal arrangements which a 
person who is still capable can take to provide for any subsequent incapacity.” 
 
 
12 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, s71. 
13 See Part 2 of the 2000 Act, which entered into force on 2nd April 2001. 




Principle 1 of the 2009 Recommendation reads: 
 
“1. States should promote self-determination for capable adults in the event of their future incapacity, by 
means of continuing powers of attorney and advance directives. 
 
2. In accordance with the principles of self-determination and subsidiarity, states should consider giving 
those methods priority over other methods of protection.” 
 
Principle 14 of Recommendation 2014(2) on the promotion of human rights of older persons 
reads: 
 
“Member States should provide for legislation which allows older persons to regulate their affairs in the 
event that they are unable to express their instructions at a later stage.” 
 
Unlike the earlier Recommendations, Recommendation 2014(2) also introduces the right to 
support. 
 
Principle 13 declares that: 
 
“Older persons have the right to receive appropriate support in taking their decisions and exercising their 
legal capacity when they feel the need for it, including by appointing a trusted third party of their own 
choice to help with their decisions. This appointed party should support the older person on his or her 
request and in conformity with his or her will and preferences.” 
 
Having approached the gap from various angles, let us rewind and follow another thread of 
my remit today, which is to trace briefly some aspects of my own experience, and the 
developments in which I have been involved, through to date, before concluding with my 
thoughts as to where all of these trends have taken us, and where I believe they will take us 
out into the future. 
 
In 1961 I was part of the intake for Scotland’s first ever full-time law degrees, offered as first 
degrees. At that time no coherent subject of incapacity law, under any title, existed. That 
was still the case in 1976 when a friend who was an educational psychologist asked me to 
address a group of parents of children with learning disabilities who wanted to know about 
their children’s status in law then, and once they became adults. I said that I knew nothing 
about that subject. My friend said that they could not find any lawyer who did, so could I try 
to put together a talk for those parents. As a favour to a friend, I did so, thinking no more 
about it until a second group asked me to do the same. The vacuum quickly sucked me in. 
By 1984, Enable (then the Scottish Society for the Mentally Handicapped) asked me to write 
a book14 encapsulating the topic, so I did, thinking that they could sell the book and I could 
regain my evenings. 
 
Demand doubled, particularly because at that time Scots law was in some respects beginning 
to progress beyond black and white concepts of total incapacity derived from a diagnosis. 
That had started with the abolition in the Education (Scotland) Acts 1980 and 1981 of the 
concept that some children were ineducable, replacing that with the concept of special 
 
14 Ward “Scots Law and the Mentally Handicapped”, SSMH, 1984. 




educational needs and the requirement for a record of needs setting out an individualised 
assessment and package of provision. Next, anticipating by several years the Disability 
Convention and published views of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, came the abolition of plenary disqualifying guardianship in personal welfare 
matters, which applied in all cases where any guardianship was required. Abolition came in 
the Mental Health (Scotland) (Amendment) Act of 1983, consolidated into the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984. The preceding regime, dating from 191315, was linked to the process of 
institutionalisation under the Lunacy Acts, starting in 1857. It was directed at remedying the 
perceived “lasting injury to the community” resulting from the presence of people with 
learning disabilities “at large in the population”. It was a regime under which they should be 
“placed” in institutions or in guardianship. 
 
The statutory guardianship introduced in 1984 conferred fixed and limited powers designed 
“as a means of ensuring that some mentally disordered people living in the community 
received the protection and support they require”. There were already trends internationally 
towards creating limited guardianship along the same lines as the reforms to our education 
law, assessing individual need and creating an individual package of provision. That was the 
context in which I also researched the history of the subject, encapsulated in the diagram 
that I have shown you, based on a diagram down to 1990 included in my book of that year 
“The Power to Act”16. 
 
I was in the midst of these researches when along came the parents of Simon Morris17. Simon 
had recently attained majority. He still needed the support of his parents in many matters, 
including encouragement towards independence and making his own decisions. His parents 
were hampered by lack of recognition of their role, and also felt that they should not be 
playing such a role without some legal authority. They had studied my 1984 book, including 
the “comments and suggestions” in the last chapter. My researches told me that although 
procedure to appoint tutors-dative to adults had fallen into disuse, they had never been 
abolished, and indeed in 1923 there had been an isolated case of appointment with powers 
limited to personal welfare matters. So in 1986 we petitioned the Court of Session to revive 
the procedure, to do so in accordance with modern perceptions and principles, and to meet 
what was expressly observed as Simon’s needs for support with an appointment with powers 
limited to those shown by medical certificates to be necessary, and time-limited to ensure 
review. The petition was granted18. The concept was increasingly used, and increasingly 
refined and developed, throughout the period from then until Part 6 of the Incapacity Act 
came into force on 1st April 2002. Some appointments covered specific self-contained 
decision-making, for example in medical matters, foreshadowing intervention orders.  
 
 
15 Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913. 
16 Ward “The Power to Act”, SSMH, 1990. 
17 Where I use real names in this paper, they are already in the public domain and/or I have permission to use 
them. 
18 Morris, Petitioner (unreported) 1986 – see Ward, “Revival of Tutors-Dative”, 1987 SLT (News) 69: Revival of 
tutors-dative to adults. 




However, tutors-dative were appointed only in personal welfare matters. Until 2002 we still 
had curators bonis acting in property and financial matters, again under a regime which 
completely disqualified the adult if such an appointment were made. The human rights 
violations (as we would now describe them) of that regime were multiple, and I sought to 
describe them in my 1990 book. Then along came Eileen Britton with her parents. As a 
youngster, Eileen had been brain-injured by a hit and run driver. Substantial damages had 
been awarded. By the time that I met the family, they were administered by a curator bonis. 
The family had been advised by a welfare rights officer to see a lawyer because the income 
allowed to Eileen by her curator was less than if she had never received the damages, and 
had been dependent upon state benefits. In the memorable words of her father: “Mr Ward, 
we are just ordinary working class people, but this does not seem right. Can you help us?” 
In my efforts to persuade the curator bonis to change his policies, I was a complete failure. 
When I went to see him, before my bottom even touched the chair, he had pronounced: 
“The family know that Eileen has money. They want to get their hands on it. It’s as simple 
as that.” To try to get the conversation going, I mentioned Eileen’s desire to try typing. She 
might never be the world’s best typist, but she wanted to try, and could easily afford a 
typewriter. Had she never said this to the curator? I then learned that he had never met her. 
He would neither budge nor resign. 
 
However, curator bonis procedure was not devised by the legislature. It was invented by the 
courts, and thereafter regulated, initially by an Act of Sederunt of 173019. Curators bonis had 
in practice replaced appointment of tutors-at-law, because that procedure came to be 
regarded as “very absurd, very cumbrous, and very expensive”. Such words would never 
apply to any modern procedure, would they? Curators bonis were originally introduced as a 
temporary measure pending service of a tutor-at-law. Tutors-at-law trumped curators bonis. 
Back we went to the Court of Session. The curator bonis opposed. The family won20. Eileen’s 
father became her tutor-at-law. He always felt that it was unfair that this ancient procedure 
did not recognise the role of Eileen’s mother. After he had become a guardian under the 
transitional provisions of the Incapacity Act, she was appointed as additional joint guardian. 
They applied their role inventively. Eileen deserved greater independence, but still required 
support. The family lived in the ground floor of a four-in-a-block building. The house above 
theirs became vacant. Through her guardians, Eileen bought it. It was marvelous for me to 
experience the pride with which she admitted me after I had rung the bell, invited me in, and 
showed me round. Unfortunately, her life was bracketed at both ends with tragedy. She 
succumbed to breast cancer at a very young age. Sitting quietly at the back of the church at 
her funeral, I reflected on how the true heroes of the development of our law were these 
and many other families, motivated by a basic sense of injustice and challenging our 
profession to deliver justice. 
 
That case, unlike Morris, is in the law reports. It was decided in 1992. Back in 1986 I had 
proposed to Scottish Law Commission a coordinated review and reform of both mental health 
and incapacity law. Their response was that such a task would be too large, but they could 
 
19 Act of Sederunt 1730, see also Judicial Factors Acts 1849, 1880 and 1889. 
20 Britton v Britton’s Curator Bonis, 1992 SCLR 947. 
 




take on incapacity law. I was recruited on a temporary, part-time basis to the Commission 
as an external expert. What is now essentially our Incapacity Act appeared as a draft Bill 
annexed to the Commission’s 1995 Report on Incapable Adults. That same collective sense 
of injustice carried through to the campaign for enactment. I had the great honour to be 
recruited as principal spokesperson for the campaign. In the run-up to the first elections for 
the Scottish Parliament, I went to all the party conferences and secured the commitment of 
every party to support the legislation. I then had the unique experience for any lawyer of 
accompanying the first major legislation through a brand-new Parliament.  
 
The Incapacity Act completed the shift from what I term old law to new law. Old law was 
characterised by fixed provision, often complete incapacitation, based on diagnosis. New law 
sought to provide an individualised package of provision based on assessment. I prepared 
Diagram B21 twenty years ago to encapsulate the basic structure of the Act. It speaks for 
itself.  
 
Before that, other things had happened. As to service provision, various involvements 
included the founder chairmanship in 1978 of Renfrew District Association for Mental Health, 
subsequently renamed RAMH – “Recovery Across Mental Health”. From 1992 to 1997 I 
chaired successive NHS Trusts with an expanding remit covering learning disability, mental 
health and community services, and services for the elderly, in what was then the central 
region of Scotland. That included responsibility for the Royal Scottish National Hospital, which 
only shortly beforehand had been severely criticised by the Mental Welfare Commission for 
overcrowding to the extent that some residents could only reach their own beds by climbing 
over others, personal clothing got mixed up and redistributed in the laundry, and there was 
a lack of general stimulation and appropriate activity. The population was reducing as, in the 
language of the time, residents were “repatriated” to areas all over Scotland and the north 
of England. But those considered most difficult were left behind. So, as I can now admit, we 
broke the rules. We did what an NHS body should not do. We started buying ordinary houses 
in surrounding communities, registering them voluntarily with the local authority to ensure 
independent supervision and monitoring of standards, and started moving our residents out 
into them. I learned much else, beyond the scope of this talk, in those years. 
 
Another development began in an improbable way in 1991. The former Soviet Union had 
broken up. Many of the constituent nations wanted to enhance their human rights standards 
with a view to joining the Council of Europe, in many cases as a stepping-stone to 
membership of the European Union. In their search for accessible material, they had 
somehow come across my 1984 and 1990 books, written in straightforward language for 
non-lawyers. My involvement in that whole region thus began, with echoes of the 
development of my involvement in Scotland. Yet again, I was asked to write a book, this time 
“A New View”, published in 1993 and rapidly translated into five other languages22. That was 
 
21 Appended to this paper. 
22 Ward “A New View”, International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped (subsequently “Inclusion 
International”), 1993 (English-language edition); also published in Czech (1994), Estonian (1995), Russian 
(1995), Polish (1996) and Lithuanian (1999). 




a year after Gordon Ashton and I jointly produced “Mental Handicap and the Law”23, which 
we were told was the first textbook to cover the law on a topic for both Scotland and England 
& Wales. That is certainly what Lord Mackay of Clashfern thought, and he kindly wrote a 
most generous Foreword. 
 
Across Europe and the former Soviet Union, my travels were generated partly by individual 
countries, partly by projects funded by the European Union, and also in the mental health 
sphere by World Health Organisation. Yet again, I myself was on a huge learning curve. 
Scotland was seen as a world leader in the subject, and also as helpfully straddling both 
common law and civil law jurisdictions. Later involvements included joint authorship of “The 
International Protection of Adults”24, contributions to various English and other textbooks, 
and a particular line of work in relation to voluntary measures – a series of seminars here in 
Scotland in the 1990s, advising the Nordic nations on the introduction of powers of attorney 
in 2007, joining the working party to draft Recommendation (2009)11, then more recently 
reviewing implementation of that Recommendation throughout Europe for Council of Europe. 
 
Let me now pick up some more themes from all of that. Terminology continues to shift, and 
also to trip us up as soon as we cross borders. Back in 1980, World Health Organisation 
introduced the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps25, but 
we now use “impairment” where that document used “disabilities”, and we use “disabilities” 
in place of “handicaps” to mean the disadvantages encountered in society, including physical 









“Capacity” and “incapacity” have unfortunate dual meanings. In the Disability Convention 
and associated literature, “capacity” means the holding of rights and status, and exercising 
these is referred to as “the exercise of legal capacity”. Our Incapacity Act defines incapability, 
meaning factual incapability, and provides that “incapacity shall be construed accordingly”26. 
 
23 Ashton and Ward “Mental Handicap and the Law”, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992. 
24 Frimston, Ruck Keene, van Overdijk and Ward “The International Protection of Adults”, Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
25 Geneva, 1980. 
26 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, definition of capacity: 
 “1. – (6) For the purposes of this Act, and unless the context otherwise requires –  
‘adult’ means a person who has attained the age of 16 years; 
‘incapable’ means incapable of –  
a) acting; or 
b) making decisions; or 
c) communicating decisions; or 
d) understanding decisions; or 
Impairments Disabilities Handicaps 
Impairments Disabilities 




As a general piece of advice, where another jurisdiction uses what appears – often in 
translation – to be terminology with which we are familiar, to a greater or lesser extent it will 
mean something different. 
 
Such caution may also be necessary in interpreting international instruments. I have three 
general comments on the interpretation of such instruments, sometimes relevant also to 
statutory interpretation. Firstly, often overlooked is the difference between principles, 
whether in human rights instruments or in our own Incapacity Act, and rules of law. 
Principles, in the famous words of Douglas Bader as once quoted to me by one of our most 
highly respected sheriffs, “are for the guidance of wise men and the obedience of fools”. 
Applying them blindly in isolation can produce daft results. If they conflict in particular 
circumstances, that is not a disaster – they have to be balanced to meet those particular 
circumstances. Secondly, documents such as the Disability Convention are not targeted 
exclusively at the laws, practices and experience of any one country. They are drawn from 
worldwide experience, and often the least satisfactory worldwide experience, of which I have 
given you a few snippets. Thirdly, documents such as the Disability Convention and 
comments on it tend to be weighted, even in the disability sphere, in favour of those able to 
articulate personal experience most loudly, creating hierarchies, so that particular care is 
needed in relation to the people with whom we as lawyers need to be most greatly concerned, 
namely those towards the bottom of such hierarchies. 
 
The phrase “rights, will and preferences” features prominently in the Disability Convention 
and surrounding discussion27. These elements are often at odds with each other. It is often 
people with relevant disabilities themselves who lead calls for careful balancing of these 
elements, with no one element automatically overriding the other two. Thus, a group of 
people with lived experience of compulsory psychiatric intervention agreed with the 
statement of one of them that “I am glad that when I was ill my right to life was considered 
more important than my right to autonomy”. A group of people with learning disabilities 
articulated the need, when will and preferences seemed to be at odds, for someone else to 
determine what was the overriding will; and even for predictable future will to override 
currently expressed will. Where there is some confusion between will and preferences, in a 
recently published article Dr Curk and I argued that there can only be one expression of will 
in a particular matter at any one time, derived from preferences, sometimes a bundle of 
preferences which may conflict with each other, and including preferences which reflect the 
in-built character and background of the individual. We quoted an analysis by Viscount Stair 
of the stages of will through to commitment, and equated this with the example of online 
 
e) retaining the memory of decisions, 
….. 
‘incapacity’ shall be construed accordingly.” 
27 Disability Convention Article 12.4: “States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of 
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards … . Such safeguards shall ensure that measures 
relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, … . The 
safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and interests.” 




shopping: selecting an item, putting it in the basket, but only committing to purchase upon 
review of the basket and total cost, and perhaps rejecting some items at that stage28.  
 
A key element of the Scottish Law Commission’s 1995 report29, carried forward into the 
Incapacity Act, was the rejection of a best interests test, appropriate as I have already said 
to the law of children, and inappropriate for adults. I frankly disagree with precedents which 
suggest that our benefit principle is the primary principle30. That seems to amount to adopting 
a best interests test. It is not supported either by our legislation or by the intentions behind 
it, which give no priority to any principle. If in the modern human rights era any principle 
should have priority, it is the requirement to take account of the present and past wishes and 
feelings of the adult31, including – in the language of the UN Committee – the best 
interpretation thereof where necessary32. Prior to the Convention, I had already suggested a 
methodology for achieving that in the last chapter of my 2003 book “Adult Incapacity”, 
entitled “Constructing Decisions”33. 
 
It is not my intention to speak in detail about the Three Jurisdictions Report, published well 
over three years ago by Essex Autonomy Project34. My very first meeting with Wayne Martin 
of Essex University echoed that first conversation with Jill. We quickly agreed that the Three 
Jurisdictions Report was needed. So we recruited a core research group, of which the Scottish 
half included Jill and Alison Hempsey – both here today – and pressed ahead. The main 
recommendations of our Report remain highly relevant at this point. The rights, will and 
preferences of the individual must lie at the heart of every regime. There should be 
attributable duties to ascertain the individual’s will and preferences, which should only be 
overridden if stringent criteria are met. Independent advocacy services should be 
 
28 “Respecting ‘will’: Viscount Stair and Online Shopping”, Ward and Curk (with contributions by People First 
(Scotland)), 2018 SLT News 123; also published in German translation in Betreuungsrechtliche Praxis, 2019 
p54. 
29 Scottish Law Commission Report No 151 on “Incapable Adults”, September 1995. See paragraph 2.50 quoted 
in footnote 12. 
30 Sheriff Principal Stephen on 26th August 2014 in Appeal by BG in the Application by West Lothian Council,  
noted at 2014 GWD 40-730: “This is indeed the core principle namely that it is the welfare of the adult and the 
benefit to the adult which is the overarching principle. …” 
31 Lady Hale in Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James ([2013] 3 WLR 1299, [2013] COPLR 
492) (Supreme Court): “Insofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and 
values or the things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into account because they 
are a component in making the choice which is right for him as an individual human being.” 
32 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the UN Committee”), General Comment No 1 
(2014) entitled “Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law”, paragraph 21: “Where, after significant efforts 
have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and preferences of an individual, the ‘best 
interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best interests’ determinations. This respects the rights, 
will and preferences of the individual, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 4. The ‘best interests’ principle 
is not a safeguard which complies with article 12 in relation to adults. The ‘will and preferences’ paradigm must 
replace the ‘best interests’ paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others.” 
33 Ward “Adult Incapacity”, W Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, Chapter 15: “Constructing Decisions”, pp331 et 
seq. 
34 “Three Jurisdictions Report: Towards Compliance with CRPD Art. 12 in Capacity/Incapacity Legislation across 
the UK”, Martin et al, 6th June 2016, at http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/eap-three-jurisdictions-report. 




strengthened and adequately funded, and should be focused on enabling people to overcome 
obstacles35. Obligations to provide support should also be attributable and should encompass 
support for exercise of legal capacity, not simply for communication.  
 
Let me now conclude by returning to that gap, and looking into the future.  
 
Firstly, far too often the concept of tailored provision is abandoned in practice. If we look at 
powers of attorney documents or guardianship orders, it is easier to recognise the standard 
forms of particular firms, than to recognise the characteristics, circumstances and needs of 
the individual. I have picked up general international evidence of much greater use of fixed 
and plenary powers than intended in modern legislation. The reasons are to an extent 
understandable. Let’s be sure that power of attorney documents cover every eventuality that 
may arise. Let’s do the same with guardianship orders, to avoid having to go back to court 
for additional powers. 
 
In the case of guardianship orders, I would suggest that this can best be remedied by a two-
step procedure. Let the order include all the powers that might foreseeably be required, 
though still personalised to the particular person and circumstances. But at time of granting 
of the order, let the sheriff identify those immediately operable, with a simple procedure to 
bring other powers into operation when needed – perhaps a form of declaration by the 
guardian, lodged with the Public Guardian, explaining why a particular power needs to be 
brought into operation, that the guardian has used reasonable endeavours – specified – to 
support the adult in dealing with the matters without exercise of formal powers, and that the 
guardian has duly considered and applied the Act’s principles in determining that the power 
should be exercised. Sheriffs can do this without waiting for amending legislation, using their 
broad discretionary powers under sections 3(1) and (2) of the 2000 Act. Perhaps in some 
cases the section 1 principles require them to do so. 
 
In relation to powers of attorney, the gap is already being addressed. First of all, it is 
absolutely acceptable for powers of attorney to be granted with appropriate support, and the 
techniques such as using brief and simple language, and where appropriate large print, 
provided that the safeguards in Article 12.4 of the Disability Convention are applied. Such a 
style was proposed in my 2003 book36. Adequate provision of legal services must certainly 
include offering this where appropriate, as a form of support for the exercise of legal capacity.  
 
Addressing the gap in the period following granting involves including provisions for support 






35 That is to say, obstacles to comprehension or communication, so as to enable exercise of capacity. 
36 Ward “ Adult Incapacity”, W Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, pp 101-102. 
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Typically in such documents, the attorney is appointed also to be supporter38, with a general 
supporting role, and particular functions to determine and communicate: 
 
(a) what is the granter’s competent acts or decisions, and/or 
(b) the best interpretation of the granter’s will and preferences, and/or 
(c) whether or not the granter has been subjected to undue influence. 
 
Usually such documents will declare that the supporter’s opinion is definitive, except if and 
to the extent that it is shown to be manifestly incorrect.  
 
The most common complaint by persons trying to act as supporters is that they experience 
difficulty in obtaining information. Such documents accordingly instruct and authorise that 
the supporter shall be provided on request with all or any data or information relevant to the 
granter, whether confidential or not, including unredacted copies of any writings, documents 
or similar.  
 
As to co-decision-making, that appointment will declare that any act or decision by the 
granter and the attorney jointly shall be valid and binding, and shall be recognised by all 
parties as such, on the basis that to the extent that the granter does have relevant capacity, 
it is the granter’s valid and effective act or decision; and to the extent that the granter does 
not, it is the valid act or decision of the attorney acting with the authority conferred by the 
power of attorney document39. Thus in practice there need be no enquiry into the granter’s 
capabilities, because by one route or the other, the act or decision under the co-decision-
making provisions will always be valid. 
 
 
37 “Enabling citizens to plan for incapacity: Report on a review of follow-up action taken by member states of 
the Council of Europe to Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)11 on principles concerning continuing powers of 
attorney and advance directives for incapacity; Report prepared by Mr Adrian D Ward on behalf of the European 
Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ)”, June 2018, published in English and French at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cdcj/activities/powers-attorney-advance-directives-incapacity 
38 “I appoint my # to be my supporter and co-decision-maker. In relation to the whole or any part(s) of any act 
or decision by or for me, his/her opinion shall be definitive as to what are (a) my competent acts or decisions, 
and/or (b) the best interpretation of my will and preferences, and/or (c) whether or not I have been subjected 
to undue influence; except if and to the extent that his/her opinion is shown to be manifestly incorrect. I instruct 
and authorise that he/she shall, if and to the extent that he/she so requests, be provided with all or any data 
or information relevant to me, whether confidential or not, including unredacted copies of any writings, 
documents or similar.” 
39 “Any act or decision by me and him/her jointly shall be valid and binding, and shall be recognised by all 
parties as such, on the basis that it is my valid and effective act or decision to the extent that I have relevant 
capability and his/hers, acting as my attorney on my behalf, to the extent that I do not.” 




Such documents typically contain further provisions. They place an obligation on the person 
who is supporter, co-decision-maker and attorney to provide the granter with all reasonable 
support in acting, deciding, formulating the granter’s will and preferences, and 
communicating them40. There will often be further express provisions that the overriding 
purpose of the document as a whole is to facilitate the exercise by the granter of the granter’s 
legal capacity, as far as possible by the granter personally, if necessary with the attorney’s 
support, and failing that – or in the event of doubt – using the co-decision-making 
arrangements; or, failing all of those alternatives, by the attorney playing the classic role 
under the 2009 definition of acting and deciding on the granter’s behalf, but doing that on 
the basis of what the attorney reasonably believes the granter would do if capable, and in 
accordance with all other relevant human rights principles.  
 
In the modern world, and in the context of modern human rights developments41, in my view 
it would be a failure to provide adequate legal services not to offer the possibility of including 
such provisions when advising and taking instructions on preparation of powers of attorney. 
 
As with my previous suggestions, there is no reason why such provisions should not be 
included in guardianship orders, and they may be necessary to ensure full compliance with 
the section 1 principles. However, I must acknowledge the uncomfortable presence in the 
room of a massive mastodon still surviving from ancient times, in terms of development of 
human rights. That is the procedure for appointment of DWP appointees, conscientiously 
operated by many, but violating almost all relevant human rights requirements as to both 
appointment process and effective lack of accountability and supervision, giving rise to 
constant examples of misuse42. Among my failures is a complete failure over very many years 
to date to have these obvious deficiencies mitigated.  
 
Four final thoughts are these. 
 
Firstly, my work for Council of Europe identified that everywhere the concept of advance 
directives as a unilateral instrument complementary to powers of attorney, is undeveloped. 
Provision was included in the Draft Incapable Adults Bill of 1995, but disappeared from our 
Incapacity Act. It requires to be reinstated. 
 
Secondly, twenty years after the Incapacity Act went through its parliamentary passage, we 
are in a process of comprehensive reform that is likely to take some time yet to result in 
updated law. Such updated law will require to be future-proofed. In my view it will require, 
for example, to take account of likely development of Fintech to enable creation of individual 
packages for financial management. If they become sufficiently sophisticated, with sufficient 
 
40 “The provisions of this paragraph are subject to the proviso that he/she shall have provided all reasonable 
support to me in acting, in deciding, and in formulating my will and preferences, and in communicating all of 
these.” 
41 Essex Autonomy Project – Three Jurisdictions Report (June 2016): Full potential as instruments of support 
and for exercise of legal agency of powers of attorney and advance directives should be recognised (Rec. 7). 
42 Essex Autonomy Project – Three Jurisdictions Report (June 2016): “Legislation should ensure CRPD 
compliance for all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity”. 




input as to a person’s priorities, preferences, wishes and circumstances, is there any reason 
in principle why such a package should not have the same status as a continuing power of 
attorney? Could it be put in place upon granting of a guardianship order? If sufficiently 
sophisticated and accurately reflective of the individual, could it be a tool to guide the 
operation of welfare guardianship? 
 
Thirdly, in my old overhead slides in the 1970s I pointed out that special provision equals 
discrimination, and protection equals disqualification43. The dilemmas identified then still 
need much work in the era of the Disability Convention to achieve in practice maximum 
implementation of the prohibition in Article 5 against discrimination on the basis of disability 
and of the requirement of Article 12 for recognition of legal capacity in all matters on an 
equal basis with others, by finding least restrictive and disqualifying ways of providing the 
protection against exploitation and abuse required by Article 16. 
 
Finally, I return to that contradictory creation of special categories. Currently, every month 
sees one or more consultations on proposals to address the needs of vulnerable clients or 
vulnerable consumers44. There are as many definitions of vulnerability as there are 
consultations. All carry the risks that I have described of inappropriate inclusion or exclusion, 
and of categorisation. To a large extent, it would be better to develop techniques of universal 
design to ensure general inclusivity. 
 
The same applies even more to legal systems. I have argued the point many times, ever 
since “A New View” in 1993. Put simply, the individual human being, characterised by 
Lauterpacht as the basic unit of all law, is depicted in law as the fully capable, fully able and 
well-resourced person – until recently male person. Laws seek to accommodate everyone 
else by special exceptions and special provisions. I have argued, and shall continue to argue, 
for what I now describe as the principle of reversed jurisprudence45. All laws should be 
rigorously tested for maximum possible inclusivity. If some people do not need some of the 
resulting provisions and protections, that is not a problem. Failure to deliver true equality 
before the law, in all of our law, is a fundamental problem.  
 
We can take particular pride in the recognition of Scotland’s leading role in this subject by 
the award to us of the World Congress on Adult Capacity from 7th – 9th June 202246. We are 
by far the smallest country ever to host that event, and shall be only the second European 
 
43 From overhead slides in the 1970s: 
- “minimum necessary special provision, accurately related to need” 
- “no unnecessary imposition of special provision” 
- “special provision = discrimination” 
- “protection = disqualification” 
44 At time of writing, the Mental Health and Disability Committee of the Law Society of Scotland had received 
thirty such consultation documents since 1st January 2019. 
45 Lohnig et al “Kindesrecht und Elternkonflikt”, Gieseking, 2013: see “Children’s Rights and Parental Conflict in 
Great Britain”, Ward, pp264-265; see also Ward “A New View”, ILSMH, 1993 “Postscript: A Contradiction and a 
Vision”, page 198. 
46 World Congress on Adult Capacity, WCAC 2022, Edinburgh International Conference Centre, 7th – 9th June 
2022. 




country to do so after – by then – it will have been held in every inhabited continent except 
Africa.  
 
WCAG 2010  Japan 
WCAG 2012  Australia 
WCAG 2014  USA 
WCAG 2016  Germany 
WCAG 2018  South Korea 
WCAG 2020  Argentina 
WCAC 2022  Scotland 
 
Those of you with sharp eyes, if they are still open, will note the shift from “WCAG” to 
“WCAC”. Hitherto, the title of these Congresses has been “World Congress on Adult 
Guardianship”. A subsidiary success for Scotland has been to obtain the necessary 
international board approval to change this, in 2022, to “World Congress on Adult Capacity”. 
For the people upon whom all such regimes should be centred, the implications have the 
potential for practical, not merely symbolic, refocusing. 
 
In our whole subject we are in challenging times, with huge potential for better delivery in 
practice of basic human rights. Despite my rather long personal involvement, I have to say 
that in many ways we are only beginning. 
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